Orthopraxy and Spirituality

Conference on Rabbinic Spirituality, Beit Morasha, Jerusalem, December 2006.


Orthopraxy and Spirituality

Professor Sol Schimmel
Hebrew College


הלואי אותי עזבו ותורתי שמרו

“Would That They Had Left Me But Observed (Guarded) My Torah”:[1]
Is There Room for Spirituality Without Faith, in Rabbinic Judaism?

Is Jewish spirituality[2] possible through the performance of mitzvot (ritual and ethical behaviors) [and/or the study of Torah], in the absence of religious faith or belief?
I will not define the word ‘spirituality’, but will let the definition emerge from the discussion of the topic, as Alon Goshen-Gottstein has suggested in his description of the theme of the conference.

Among the questions of interest to me are:

1. Is there, from rabbinic perspectives, any spiritual benefit to the performance of mitzvot in accordance with traditional, orthodox, halakhic norms, on the part of a Jewish atheist, agnostic, or denier of Torah Min Shamayim? I refer to such behavior as orthopraxy.[3] If so, what may it be and why? How do various traditional thinkers view the ‘orthoprax’ person?

2. How does the orthoprax atheist, agnostic, or denier of Torah Min Shamayim view his or her own performance of mitzvoth? What does the orthoprax individual consider to be his or her reasons and motives for observance, and what effects does he or she discern as a consequence of orthopraxy?



PERFORMANCE OF MITZVOT

Positive Aspects

From a traditional perspective what are some of the positive aspects of performing mitzvoth even in the absence of belief?

1. Public performance of mitzvot affirms the individual’s identification with ‘klal yisrael’ which is a central value of traditional Judaism.[4]

2. Performance of mitzvot by a non-believing individual reinforces the religious practices and commitments of the community at large. Public transgressions are in some cases construed to be a ‘hillul hashem’, and can also threaten the commitments of others to kiyum mitzvot. Therefore the public mitzvah performances of the heretic are positively valued.

3. There is an intrinsic spiritual power in the performance of mitzvot independent of their meaning for the one who performs them.[5]

4. Performance of mitzvot has within it the power to transform the individual’s beliefs. Actions generate values and beliefs (a recurring theme, e.g. in Sefer HaHinukh).

5. There are positive ethical and social values to certain mitzvoth which do not require belief commitments in order for them to be effective. This is self-evident in the case of mitzvoth beyn adam lehavero. However, according to some ‘taamey hamitzvot’ this could also apply to certain rituals that on the surface appear to be exclusively beyn adam lamakom. For example, certain halakhot of kashrut, if interpreted as sensitizing the individual to the suffering of animals, and by way of extension, to human suffering as well, could achieve such objectives in the absence of belief in God or in the divine basis of halakha. Therefore the performance of mitzvot by the non-believer is to be appreciated and encouraged.

6. There are certain merits (zekhuyot) to the performance of mitzvoth which might impact on descendants of the person who performs them though not on he himself. The Netziv writes in Meshiv Davar (Helek Aleph, Siman 44 [quoting Sanhedrin 105b, also in Horayot 10b] ):
שו"ת משיב דבר חלק א סימן מד

וברבה שם איתא… אותי עזבו ואת תורתי לא שמרו הלואי אותי עזבו ותורתי שמרו מתוך שהיו מתעסקין בה מחזירן למוטב וידוע המאמר בכ"מ לעולם יעסוק אדם בתורה ובמצות אפילו שלא לשמה שמתוך שלא לשמה בא לשמה, ורגיל העולם לפרש שבסוף ילמוד לשמה ולפי זה הפירוש אם כל למודו יהי' שלא לשמה אינו עולה לרצון, אבל בסנהדרין (דף קה:) למדנו ביאור אחר דהכי איתא שם א"ר לעולם יעסוק אדם בתורה ובמצות אפילו שלא לשמה שמתוך שלא לשמה בא לשמה שבשכר ארבעים ושתים קרבנות שהקריב בלק זכה ויצאה ממנו רות הרי למדנו פי' בא לשמה שהוא זוכה שיצא ממנו דור שיעשה לשמה:

Now Balak’s purpose in sacrificing 42 karbanot was in order to curse Israel, and yet it had some redeeming value. (See Maharsha on Horayot 10b).


R. Shneur Zalman MiLiady (Shulkhan Arukh HaRav) after discussing the different types of ‘limud Torah shelo lishma’, concludes:

1. הלכות תלמוד תורה פרק ד סעיף ג.
וכך אמרו חכמי הקבלה שכל התורה ומצות שאדם עושה בעודו רשע אף שמוסיף כח בקליפות לפי שעה מכל מקום כשיחזור אח"כ בתשובה בגלגול זה או בגלגול אחר כמ"ש “כי לא ידח ממנו נידח” אזי מוציא מהקליפה כל התורה והמצות וחוזרים לקדושה בחזרתו. ולפיכך אין לו למנוע מלעסוק לעולם:



Negative Aspects

From a traditional perspective what are some of the negative aspects of performing mitzvoth in the absence of belief ?[6]

1. Hypocrisy and Dishonesty – ‘eyn tokho kebaro’. It involves misrepresentation of who one really is, if most people will assume that one who performs is a believer. It could also be considered Genevat Da’at; mirma; ramaut.

2. Undesirable Psychological Consequences. Orthopraxy is “living a lie” and this is emotionally and psychologically unhealthy for the individual. It creates tensions between one’s beliefs and one’s practices which can have negative repercussions for the individual and for his family. The cognitive, affective, and behavioral aspects of one’s personality cannot be adequately integrated.[7]

3. Dangerousness. One who performs mitzvoth, and as a consequence will be assumed by many to be a believer, will be listened to more readily when he or she teaches or preaches heretical notions, than one who does not perform mitzvoth. In some yeshivot I attended I was told that Reform Jews are ‘better’ than Conservative Jews” because they will be less able to influence the community of the faithful in a negative way.

4. Sacrilege - Hilul HaKodesh. It is a desecration of a ritual or of a ritual object if you perform the ritual or use the object in the performance of a ritual, while not believing that the ritual is a divine mandate.

5. Inaccurate Modeling of Religious Behavior. The non-believer who performs mitzvoth will be more prone to performing them in a manner that might not conform to strict halakhic rules. Others who observe such a person might mistakenly assume that the way they are performing the ritual is the proper way.

6. Creating Undesirable Ambiguity. Certain groups or sects that were threats to traditional Judaism observed many mitzvoth, from the Sadduccess, the early Christians and later Judeo-Christians, to contemporary Messianic Jews. This can make it hard for the unlearned to distinguish between the ‘true’ or ‘authentic’ Judaism, and the ‘false’ and ‘inauthentic’ sectarians, or derivative religions. Someone, like David Berger, for example, who considers Messianic Chabad to be a form of avodah zara would probably feel much less threatened by its outreach efforts if such habadniks ceased performing mitzvoth.

[Study of Torah by a skeptic or heretic and teaching Torah to a skeptic or heretic]

The above analysis of pros and cons with respect to orthopraxy, from traditional perspectives, applies for the most part as well, to the study of Torah. However, study of Torah is accorded special status in rabbinic thought and a few additional considerations come into play in the case of Torah study by a non-believer or by someone who does not perform other mitzvot.

Negative Aspects

1. Lekanter. Tosafot distinguish between someone who learns Torah Shelo Lishma for some personal, selfish motive and someone who studies Torah Shelo Lishma in order ‘lekanter’ – to annoy or to provoke to anger another person; or perhaps to challenge or mock Torah and thus provoke God to anger. The former, motivated by some personal interest or ambition, though far from being motivated by the ideal of Torah Lishma, is welcomed; the latter, motivated by a desire to provoke anger or to annoy, is condemned. The hope is that the former will eventually come around to a deeper appreciation of Torah as the word of God; no such expectation exists for the latter, and he is knowledge is dangerous.

2. Knowledge of Torah can be put to evil use. In fact, a traditionalist might think that the only possible reason why a non-believer would want to study Torah would be in order to use his knowledge to challenge Torah and lehahti et harabim. I should note that the traditionalist has a very legitimate fear in this regard. Just as tradition justifies studying heresy by the aphorism ‘da ma shetashiv le’apikoros’, it recognizes that the apikoros might study Torah for ‘da ma shetashiv la’maamin’. In fact, historically many gentiles and scholars have studied and used Torah with such a purpose in mind (among other purposes). (For example, the Daat Emet project, in which several apikorsim use their very impressive knowledge of tradition to try to undermine the orthodox beliefs and commitments of haredim).

3. Misconstrual of Torah. Another assumption of the tradition sometimes is that when a ‘kofer’ or ‘apikoros’ studies Torah he will either consciously or unconsciously misunderstand or misconstrue its meaning. This could be because:

a. lacking the proper emunah he will not study it with the necessary intensity and devotion required by Torah study in order to master Torah.

b. he will come to it with false preconceptions which will automatically influence the way in which he interprets it, and will distort its essential truths.

c. he will not be granted the divine grace of true understanding of the Torah granted to a maamin, because he is a kofer, rasha, or apikoros.

Hence the Torah he studies – is transformed into a corrupted version of what the Torah is ‘really’ teaching. Therefore better not for a kofer to study Torah than for him to study it.

Positive Aspects

1. The power of Torah study is so great that it can overcome the evil qualities of the learner.

2. Study of Torah will bring the individual back to a belief in its divine origin.

3. Objectivity in understanding Torah can be possible even for a kofer. Moreover a kofer can still have respect for the wisdom of the Torah. Therefore better that he should study it than be an am haaretz.

4. A kofer might have the potential to become an expert in Torah. He can contribute to its elucidation which in turn can contribute to the maamin’s understanding of Torah, assuming the view that it is permissible to read books about Torah written by the kofer and or to study directly from him. This applies the notion of ‘kabel et ha’emet mimi she’omro’ even to a skeptic or kofer.[8]

[Reflections of orthopraxists on why they observe mitzvoth]

I would like to turn now to the other side of the coin, so to speak. How do contemporary individuals who define or consider themselves to be orthoprax but not orthodox, (rather than both orthodox and orthoprax), explain their motives and reasons for observing mitzvoth in the absence of belief in their divine origin and authority? What do they see as the pros and cons of such a lifetstyle? What are its social and emotional implications? Here I will cite several comments on various blogs where the issue was addressed. I begin with a posting of mine to the (now discontinued) blog ‘Not the Gadol Hador’, (but reincarnated as extremegh.blogspot.com) and some responses to it. The respondents to my questions are in no way a representative sample of orthoprax individuals. I did not conduct any controlled experiment. I only cite them to give a sense of some of the rationales that orthoprax individuals offer for their behavior, but not a frequency distribution of these rationales.

ORTHOPRAXY
Posted by Sol Schimmel, May 22, 2006

The following issues have been discussed or alluded to on this blog in various postings and comments, and on several other blogs dealing with related issues in the orthodox world. However, I thought it might be of interest to present this set of questions more systematically.

1. What are the reasons/motives[9] which individuals who no longer believe in the fundamental doctrines or dogmas of orthodox Judaism, (especially TMS and the authority of the Written and the Oral Law) continue to perform, in accordance with halakhic definitions, its prescribed rituals, and refrain from violating its prohibitions (i.e. are orthoprax)? What arguments, from the pragmatic to the emotional to the philosophical, can be brought to justify orthopraxy, if it needs any justification at all?

2. Are there any negative consequences to orthopraxy, and if so what are they? Who might be ‘hurt’ by such behavior, and how?

3. Is it hypocritical (the definition and evaluation of which could be a topic in and of itself) to be orthoprax in public (including within one’s family setting) but non-practicing in private situations or in situations where no one who is socially important to you would know that you are ‘violating’ halakha? Or is it perfectly plausible, honest, and even healthy to behave differently in the different social contexts?


Here are excerpts from some responses to my posting:

1. What's so bad about living your life according to a rabbinic system, in a strong Jewish community with Torah values?

As someone who believes that living a dogmatic, unthinking, unchallenging life is actually anti-Torah... Orthoprax solves everything. It allows you to take the doctrines you like, ignore the rest, and still live in the fold…I actually teach Tanach and Gemara at an Ortho high school, and I don't believe in TMS - yet that doesn't stop me from living an active religious life and teaching Torah- the two are not mutually exclusive.

Sara 05.23.06 - 12:10 am #

2. Grew up Right Wing Orthodox (beis yaakov), am married with kids and often find it all pointless. I wouldn't dream of ever telling my husband. I’m orthoprax because its the only life I know and I would rather my kids grow up in this world than the secular world outside.
anonymous 05.23.06 - 7:40 am #

3. I still believe in G-d, but I have questions. I have pretty much abandoned any real belief in TMS. I believe… that Bereishit 1-11 and other sections are myth/allegory or whatever… Orthopraxis is a viable alternative. Maybe not for all, but for some. It's not hypocrisy if it serves a purpose for the Orthoprax. Judaism is very much a communal religion; many, if not most practices are centered around community interaction. In its purest form I believe Orthodox culture is better than the rest of the world's. It emphasizes study, family values, and public service. One can function as an Orthoprax, while critically choosing what practices they are comfortable with and eschewing what they are not, and at the same time remaining a member of the community…

nicejewishguy Homepage 05.23.06 - 12:48 pm #

4. Although I have had my doubts about TMS for about the last 35 years…and have lived my adult life first as a orthroprax doing the minimum, then non-religious Jew, and now a full halachik orthoprax Modern Orthodox. I love Judaism too much to chuck it. Here are my reasons.

I have a strong cultural and historical attachment to am yisroel…As a result of my feelings I will not cut off generations of Jews by becoming a non practicing Jew. So I want my children and God willing my grandchildren to be Jews.

As a working father with children I love Shabbos. The time for resting and learning and catching up with my family is precious and I look forward to Shabbos. Shabbos is such a wonderful concept that besides the experiential high that I get I feel it is hard to believe that man thought of this idea.

I have more or less always loved learning and for the last 7 years learn everyday and would never give that up…

Now a Halachik Orthoprax 05.23.06 - 1:00 pm #

5. At one time, I used to believe that without a belief in God, observance of the mitzvos was completely illogical. Why put on tefillin if God didn't tell you to? Why eat only kosher food when shrimp might be more tasty if not for the fact that we received Heavenly instructions to the contrary.

However, as I matured…I came to realize that there is an inherent value in ritual and community, even if one doesn't necessarily believe the myths… behind the rituals or the dogma that holds the community together. Ritual and community give structure to people's lives and, even if they don't necessarily subscribe to the religious underpinnings of the rituals, they still help to provide him with a framework for his life.

Anonymous Homepage 05.23.06 - 2:15 pm #

6. Several respondents mentioned the power of emotional conditioning in childhood commenting that emotional forces (both positive and negative) have a greater influence on behavior than does pure reason,


SCHIMMEL - My Follow Up Posting:
May 25, 2006

In my guest post on orthopraxy I asked:

Are there any negative consequences to orthopraxy, and if so what are they? Who might be ‘hurt’ by such behavior, and how?

To which GH responded:

"Living a lie, can be bad for your soul (if you have one)..."

Others have noted that orthopraxy has certain 'costs' - e.g. investment of resources, energy and time in observance of mitzvot, and restrictions on travel and interaction with others where it would be difficult to be halakhically observant.

If someone does a "cost-benefit" analysis, so to speak, and finds that the benefits of orthopraxy outweigh the costs, (as several posters have pointed out these past few days) then orthopraxy would seem to be a rational lifestyle.

However, some people have pointed out that they are orthoprax because of social pressure, fear of the effect that discontinuing observance would have on their family life, or guilt, which may not be 'rational' but is surely understandable. Is their orthopraxy a manifestation of cowardice or a manifestation of principle? Are they squandering resources, time and energy on halakhic observance which could be put to more constructive personal or social use?

Another related question: How many individuals who were raised in halakhically observant homes and/or yeshiva environments, in which an emphasis on scrupulous observance of ritual was inculcated - with attendant guilt in failing to perform rituals in the precisely correct way -continue to feel uncomfortable when they (or even when members of their family) are less scrupulous in observance than they were conditioned to be, even though they do not [now] believe that performance is a divine or religious obligation? Are there among you people who are not orthodox (i.e. do not accept the divine authority of halakha) and yet experience guilt or anxiety when you (or others for whom you are responsible, especially your children) are not 'medakdek' in doing the ritual in a way that would be 'yotzey'?

Is this a healthy emotional state, for such an orthoprax individual, or for his family?

Solomon Schimmel 05.24.06 - 12:13 pm #

The conversation on the blog drifted to a discussion of other matters and I did not receive many responses to this follow up set of questions, which I intend to address in another context. I will only cite a response by Godol Hador himself.

Response by Godol Hador:

1. Community & Family pressures are obviously very powerful things, I don't think Orthopraxy is just cowardice. On the contrary it's perfectly rational not to want to destroy your life or that of your family, or to go through a lot of pain. For people brought up Orthodox, remaining Orthodox is usually not such a big deal, especially if you are living in a very tolerant Modern Orthodox style community. Why change? Just to save some money on arbah minim, or be able to eat a cheeseburger? And for that to be ostracized by your family or community? Not a rational decision, as evidenced by the fact that very few people do it.

Godol Hador Homepage 05.24.06 - 12:30 pm #


To return to the original question of this paper – considered now from the perspectives of the orthoprax individual him or herself – is their any spiritual value to the practice of mitzvoth in the absence of belief in their divine origin? There is no single answer to this question – it very much depends on the individual in question and his reasons and motives for orthopraxy. Or to put it another way – what does his orthopraxy do for him in the realm of the spiritual – and spiritual can entail multiple elements, such as feeling close to a transcendent being, making one more ethically sensitive and more ethical in behavior, linking one to family, community, and klal yisrael – which as a collective entity have some spiritual contribution to make to the world. For many orthopraxists this is where the spiritual is to be found.

There can, of course, also be negative effects of orthopraxy, as I suggested in my follow up posting. Some individuals pointed out that certain halakhot i.e. praxis, are morally problematic, such as those dealing with women – about which Tamar Ross has written so eloquently, and assume that that which is immoral, unethical, or unjust cannot ipso facto be spiritual. There can also be negative psychological consequences as well.

My definition of spirituality does not seem to fit any of the examples offered by Alon. I am asking whether there can be some meaningful spirituality in ritual and behavior, in the absence of the interiority of belief and hence of devotion. Of course there can be and there are emotional effects of engagement in ritual behaviors. Often it is the external behaviors that generate the religious emotions rather than the religious emotions or devotion that generate the external behaviors. I don’t think this notion of ‘spirituality’ is relevant only to a consideration of orthopraxy as I defined it. It is of broader interest in Jewish religious experience – how does e.g. preoccupation with the fulfillment of the minutiae of halakhic rituals and the study of them, impact on Jewish religious-spiritual experience? This is a longstanding discussion in Jewish rabbinic thought, and I would suggest that Alon’s wide list of areas of the spiritual in Judaism needs to be made even wider, to encompass the spirituality that might emerge from or be embedded in the observable, visible, objective, external, behavioristic Judaism of halakha and praxis.

I would like to close with a posting which appeared on the Hasidic Rebel Blog on Erev Rosh Hashanah, 2006. This was not a response to anything I had posted. Hasidic Rebel reflects on the stages in his reactions to his denial of the tenets of Hasidic orthodoxy while continuing to live with his frum family in a Hasidic community. I would not define him as orthoprax since he refers to his secret non-frum life, and to his ‘comfort zone’ as the primary criterion in deciding which rituals to practice and when to do so. However, some of his musings are relevant to some orthopraxists as well.

Writings, musings, and ramblings from a Chasid on the edge.
posted by Hasidic Rebel @ 11:56 PM
FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 22, 2006
The Power of Choice

As we approach this frenzied season of pre-dawn waking (and awakening), long hours of prayer, days of fasting, special foods, rituals, anxieties… [(will Neilah on Yom Kippur go late again this year? will my esrog impress my neighbor? how can I keep those damn aravos from drying out so quickly?)], we all bring along baggage from years past, and reflect on how these events affect us, pleasantly or otherwise.

For those of us leading secretly non-frum lives, these events trigger conflicting emotions. Oh, how the heart is stirred when we hear that first Kaddish that marks the beginning of Selichos, the age-old chants, the reminders of what this event meant to us five or ten years ago. We might be stirred by some of the poetry in the first chapters. But as the prayers grind onwards, the monotony increases, the Chazan’s chant becomes more like an annoying whine, and we reflect on whom we’re actually beseeching for forgiveness, soon realizing, no one in particular. Which leads to the question, what exactly are we doing here? We look to our children and think, we do it for them, [and we reflect on the cruelty of a society that would deny us the love and affection of our children should we decide to openly shed our attachment to a lifestyle we find suffocating].

And this awakens our rage—oh, the injustice of it all.

But here I make a rebel’s confession: I am no longer angry, no longer seething at the hypocrisy of those around me, no longer overflowing with ridicule at the attachment of my friends and neighbors to nonsensical rituals and primitive beliefs. [No longer do I carry this lifestyle as a burden weighing me down, grinding me senseless into the mud and muck through which I am forced to tread].

I don’t know when it happened, but at some point it dawned on me. I cannot forever be held captive by the blinding desire for neighborly approval, the grand prize of prestigious shidduchim, or the fear of uncomfortable questions from the wife and kids. It was then I stopped playing by the rules. My shul participation, practice of ritual, and level of religious stricture is now entirely defined by my comfort level…

…we…have choices…My choice has been to stay rather than leave, as long as I can define my own boundaries. And the choice has been liberating. Once I realized I can leave it all behind if I want to, I realized I don’t want to that badly. And now that I define my own existence, I actually anticipate the familiar holiday rituals and customs, the songs, the food, and yes, even the prayers, all of which I partake in only as long as they feel pleasing.

Do I not understand the misery, the heartbreak, the insanity to which one can be driven when compelled to accept a despised lifestyle? Oh, do I ever… But by being angry and reactionary we gain nothing.

Our society won’t change very quickly. Our primary task then is to define what we’re for instead of what we’re against. And, at least for me, it won’t do without a spiritual component. Whether it means participating in a communal expression of hope for a new year and the desire to cleanse our souls of sin (against our fellow man, not against God), an attachment to the idea of a Higher Power—however you might define it, or chanting Ohm for an hour, they all confirm the belief that humans are more than their physical skin, flesh, and bone—however unscientific the notion. It says that life is not purposeless; that our deepest intuitions regarding our souls and a great source of life and our connectedness to one another actually mean something, and those intuitions exist for reasons not merely Darwinian.

A sweet and blessed new year to all!
posted by Hasidic Rebel @ 4:40 PM


A month later Godol Hador posted his own reflections on ‘orthopraxy’. He was defending a ‘rationalistic’ and utilitarian grounds for orthopraxy and critiquing a ‘fundamentalist haredi’ approach, which, in his view, claims that one should observe mitzvoth because God commanded that they be observed and no other justifications for practice are needed. Here is a brief excerpt from a long posting, followed by responses to it.

Posting by Godol Hador
THURSDAY, JUNE 22, 2006

…If your attitude is that you would drop Halachah if it wasn’t from God, then that clearly demonstrates that you see no intrinsic value to Halachah, you don’t think it achieves anything worthwhile, and the only reason you keep it is because some invisible Deity will award you mitzvah points in Olam Habah for keeping it, or conversely strike you down if you don’t. Basically it’s just magic tricks to score points. This is an APPALLING attitude….

Some may argue that they are only convinced Halachah has utilitarian value if they know it comes from God, but otherwise they are not convinced. But this is just playing games. Either you think Halachah works well (at least in general) or you don’t. It’s quite easy to judge, just look around and make your decision.

Personally I’m convinced, both from my own experience and also from a simple statistical analysis. Orthodox Jewsih communities always have lower rates of crime, divorce, alcoholism etc etc and higher rates of charity, good deeds etc etc. Sure, occasionally you find other ethnic groups in other communities at specific times who do well, but no one can match the Jewish record of good performance in every age and in every community. The statistics prove this out, it’s not just a matter of faith….

Divinely Inspired at 11:01 AM Comments (156)


Responses to above GH posting:

1. Are you telling me that the reason I just gave my suit to a shatnez checker to butcher, was to help lower the rates of crime, divorce, alcoholism etc etc and higher [i.e. increase] the rates of charity, good deeds etc etc?

GH responded:

Shaatnez is symbolic of our rejection of pagan idol worship practices, mixing wool and linen (animal and natural)… Of course shaatnez checking your suit is by itself not going to stop you getting divorced. But it’s a part of an overall system. Why else do you do it? Just because you have to? What's the point in that? Or do you think wool & linen have some magical evil properties which will hurt you if you wear it?

Godol Hador Homepage 06.22.06 - 11:40 am #

Responses to GH’s response:

1. How is rejecting pagan practices in 2006 a utilitarian method of instilling ethics? From an unbiased view (i,.e. not yours), there's nothing about hilchos shatnes that's going to create a more ethical person. Ethics is about other people, not fabric content…

Anonymous 06.22.06 - 12:02 pm #

2. To echo the others about sha'atnez, in the utilitarian-be-a-better-person system, who needs any of the chukim? All the explanations about rejecting ancient avodah zarah would seem to have run their course 1000 years ago.

My personal favorite at the moment is male homosexual conduct (or bestiality, or any on the arayot list that don't involve only married people). On what basis does…GH defend the Orthopraxy that says it is a terrible thing? Aren't we enlightened enough to know that is a bigoted position?..

Shmilda 06.22.06 - 12:13 pm #


3. OK, so halacha is Good. But which halacha? Why not use Conservative halacha?...Conservative halacha is ethically superior to orthodox halacha -- under the Conservative system, you don't have tolerated injustices like aguna or mamzerut. There's more opportunity for women…
Your personal life is also easier under Conservative halacha -- you don't have to scramble around looking for overpriced wine with a hekhsher…you can eat fish and meat together guilt-free, and you can even dine on swordfish…Shabbos is also a snap if you follow Conservative halacha -- no more wasting electricity keeping the lights on for 25 hours, you can turn them off and on as you please! You can even drive to shul…All of this Consertvative halacha is based on traditional sources, and while the learned might be able to argue with the decisions, they are reasonable enough to pass the laugh test. After all, if you're "deistic Orthoprax," it's not like you're worried about what Hashem wants, or even whether Hashem wants anything from us. Keeping the halacha benefits the one who keeps it, but why not keep an ethically superior rational halacha that's easier to perform?

Conservative apikoris 06.22.06 - 3:00 pm #
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From Extremegh blogspot.

Question for the learned crowd:

Is the difference between saying that 'I passionately believe in G-d' ('true believer'), and saying that my choice to behave as if he were there, creates a reality in my personal life ('Orthoprax), not primarily one of personality type?

i.e. there are those who by choice or by nature allow their rational faculty to dominate the way they experience the world, and to govern their life decisions, whereas others allow other emotive capacities to assume these same functions.

In theory, it seems that the passionate believer can easily acknowledge the fact that his belief is not based on rational logical analysis, and does not depend on the agreement of his rational faculties, while the rational philosopher may consciously work to weaken the hold of his emotive components over the rest of his character.

Avi R. 12.06.06 - 4:30 am #

________________________________________

Notes:

[1] Two of several of the classic rabbinic concepts that are relevant here are, ‘limud torah (and asiyat mitzvoth) shelo lishma’, and ‘halevay oti azavu ve’et torati shamaru’. The latter has been interpreted in several ways, especially:

Oti azavu – discontinued the practice of mitzvoth
Torati shamaru – continued studying Torah

Oti azavu – abandoned belief in and/or reliance upon me
Torati shamaru – continued studying Torah; or alternatively, continued practicing mitzvoth; or both.

[2] I will not define the word ‘spirituality’, but will let the definition emerge from the discussion of the topic, as Alon Goshen-Gottstein has suggested in his description of the theme of the conference.

[3] Many non-orthodox Jews affiliated with other religious denominations of Judaism, who observe mitzvoth selectively, and not necessarily in accordance with strict halakhic rules, might be considered ‘partial’ or ‘selective’ orthopraxists. My focus in this paper is on individuals who, at least in their public behavior, lead an orthodox lifestyle of kiyum mitzvot.
[4] Menachem Kellner. Must a Jew Believe Anything? Second Edition. “Commitment to kelal yisrae’el, the generality of Israel, overrides doctrinal orthodoxy…in many important ways, identification today with the Jewish past and a desire to be identified with the Jewish future is at least as important a criterion of Jewish legitimacy as theological ‘orthodoxy’ and adherence to hlakahah. My espousal of this view probably reflects the fact that I am not only an observant Jew, but also a Jewish nationalist, specifically a Zionist. But it also reflects, I believe, a crucial intuition of traditional Judaism that a Jew is, first, a human being, second, a member of the Jewish people, and only third a believer in the Torah of Israel.” (pps. 137-38), Oxford: Littman Library of Jewish Civilizaion, 2006.

Kellner, while granting Jewish legitimacy to the non-believer, and even to the non-practicing Jew, and while de-emphasizing the importance of one’s affirming a systematic theology and set of dogmas such as Maimonides’ ikkarim, is not an advocate of an orthopraxy devoid of thought and feeling. Ideally, one should perform mitzvoth and such performance should be permeated with ‘trust’ in God, and kavvanah directed at God.
[5] A kabbalistic concept that might be relevant is ‘avoda letzorekh gavoah’ – in some way God benefits from the performance of mitzvoth by humans. Perhaps this might apply to orthopraxis as I define it here.


[6] Assuming the individual is not included among those ‘shemoridin velo ma’alin’, in which case his very right to life is denied. See Rambam Edut; Mamrim; Teshuva. See Igrot Moshe on Conservative rabbis.

שו"ת אגרות משה אבן העזר ח"ד סימן יג

ג. ביאור שיטות הרמב"ם ורש"י לענין פסול אפיקורסין ומומרים לעדות.

והנה לבד זה איכא ספק על עצם הקידושין שהיו אצל ראביי קאנסערוואטיווי שאף אם היה מהטובים שבהם שלא היה אוכל מאכלות אסורות ולא היה מחלל שבת בפרהסיא לבא לביהכ"נ שלו במכונית, מ"מ לבד שחזקת כשרות הא ודאי לית לו וממילא פסול מספק, הא כיון שהוא חבר להראבייס דקאנסערוואטיוון ששיטתם לבטל איזה מצות התורה גם דאורייתא ורוב איסורין דרבנן שהם עניני כפירה הם פסולין לעדות אף שלא שמענו ממנו כלום, דהא כתב הרמב"ם בפי"א מעדות ה"ו האפיקורסין והמומרין לא הצריכו חכמים למנותם בכלל פסולי עדות שלא מנו אלא רשעי ישראל אבל אלו המורדין הכופרין פחותין הן מן העכו"ם שהעכו"ם לא מעלין ולא מורידין ואלו מורידין ולא מעלין, ולא הוזכר שצריכין עדים לפוסלו משום דגם להא דמורידין ולא מעלין נמי לא מצינו דצריך לעדים משום דאין זה דין ב"ד אלא דהוא תלוי בפרסום הדבר והחזקה לכל ופסלות עדותן הא תלוי במה שגרועין מן העכו"ם, שלכן גם לענין פסלות עדותן שרק זה הוא נוגע למעשה בזה"ז נמי תלוי בפרסום ובחזקה ואין לך פרסום וחזקה היותר גדול שהוא מחזיק בשיטת הקאנסערוואטיוון לכפור בהרבה דיני התורה ואולי גם לכפור בעיקר קבלת תורה בהר סיני כשהוא ראביי בבית כנסת שלהן, ואף אם עושה זה בשביל פרנסה נמי הוא בדין כופר שפסול לעדות, דלענין כפירה לא שייך לחלק בין כופר ממש ובין כופר בשביל שיש לו ריוח ושכר מזה, ואדרבה אם הוא בשביל פרנסה הא גרע לענין עדות דבמומר לתיאבון פסול לכו"ע ובמומר להכעיס הא לרבא אינו פסול.

[7] See Shalom Carmy. Forgive Us, Father-in-Law, For We Know Not What To Think: Letter To A Philosophical Dropout From Orthodoxy. Notes from Atid. Jerusalem, 2004.
[8] One educational question for traditionalists today relates to the right of a skeptic or heretic to teach torah and the permissibility of studying torah from a skeptic or heretic. Should graduates of religious high schools, yeshivot or yeshivot hesder be encouraged or discouraged from studying Tanakh, Talmud and other classical texts of traditional Judaism, in the university, where some of their teachers might be orthoprax but not orthodox? From the traditionalist perspective is there ‘sekhar’ that can outweigh ‘hefsedim’ that might result from exposure to such individuals as models, or to their critical-academic approach in the study of traditional texts? From the orthodox perspective do any of the academicians in Jewish Studies who are non-maaminim even if they are mekaymey mitzvot really understand in an ‘authentic’ sense the Torah texts they are teaching, or are those texts no longer to be considered Torah when in the academic environment? See Rubenstein and Goshen-Gottstein on different rabbinic approaches to Rabbi Meir’s relationship to Elisha Ben Avuya. (although Elisha b. Avuya wasn’t ‘orthoprax’).

[9] By ‘reasons’ I mean rational grounds for behavior which the individual can justify and articulate whereas ‘motives’ might be influences on behavior of which the individual might not be aware, and which he might not even be able to articulate.